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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH
JARED LOOSER,
Plaintiff

vs.
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF
UTAH, THE STATE INSURANCE
FUND, and SPORTS CARS INCORPORATED,
Defendants

Case
No. 8972

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF
NATURE OF THE CASE

The plaintiff was permanently injured on May
25, 1957, at LaJunta, Colorado, when the left rear
wheel of the vehicle he was driving collapsed,
causing it to leave the road and tum over, pinning
him in his seat. The plaintiff was employed as a
mechanic and test driver by the defendant, Sports
Cars Incorporated. He applied for compensation.
1
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After a contested hearing, compensation was denied
and the plaintiff brings this review.
SPECIFICATIONS OF ERROR

Plaintiff contends that the Industrial Commission erred:
1. In concluding that the accident which caused
Mr. Looser's injuries did not arise out of or in the
course of his employment.
2. In denying the plaintiff's Application for
Rehearing.
3. In failing to make written Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law.
4. In ruling that any document, other than a
brief, filed after the thirty-day statutory period has
passed cannot be considered by the Commission in
reaching its decision regarding a pending application for rehearing.
5. In filing its denial for a rehearing while the
petitioner's motion for an Order to grant plaintiff
time to respond to the Memorandum of the Defendants V\ras pending before the commission.
STATEMENT OF FACTS

Plaintiff "Vvas regularly employed as a mechanic
and occasional test driver by the defendant, Sports
2
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Cars Incorporated, and had been employed by the
Company in that capacity for over one year. (R12)
Under the terms of the employment contract, plaintiff was paid a guaranteed wage of $80.00 per week,
or 60 per cent of what was charged customers of the
company for the work which he performed each
week, whichever was greater. His average monthly
income for the first five months of 1957 was $604.00.
CR 12)
About three weeks prior to the accident involved
herein, Mr. Ernest Schettler, the President and
General Manager of the defendant, Sports Cars
Incorporated, suggested to the plaintiff that he
should prel?are his own automobile, an MGA sports
car, for racing competition. Mr. Schettler said that
the Company would pay for all the parts used to
prepare the Looser automobile for racing, but insisted
that any trophies that were won in competition had
to be given to the Company to be placed in the Company showcase for advertising purposes. CR 14)
On a prior occasion, Mr. Schettler had told the
plaintiff that by showing the people what defendant's
cars would do in competition they received much
better advertisement than if they put a story in the
newspaper. CR 22)
The plaintiff refused to race his car, asserting
that he could not afford it, and that racing was too
hard on it. CR 38)
3
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During this conversation, M. Ralph Bowyer,
the Vice-President and Service Manager of the Defendant Company, who was the immediate supervisor
of the plaintiff, entered the room. After hearing
part of the conversation, he said, "If Chad (the
plaintiff) has to drive in the race, he can drive a
company car." (R 15) No more was said about
racing at that time.
The following day, Mr. Vaughn Funk, the Secretary and Sales Manager of the Corporation, approached the plaintiff and told him to prepare a
company car for racing competition, suggesting that
they should test the car at LaJunta, Colorado, at a
race scheduled there on May 25, 1957. (R 15) The
following day, during the Company lunch hour, the
plaintiff asked Mr. Schettler if he should prepare the
Company car for racing in accordance with the previous instructions given to him by Mr. Funk. Mr.
Schettler authorized him to proceed, telling him at
that time that the company "·ould pay for the parts
which were necessary to complete the ·work. (R 17)
The plaintiff, assisted by Mr. Funk and a fellow
employee, Paul E. Krug, then prepared the car for
racing. The labor \Yas done vdthout any special
compensation from the Company. The Company
furnished and paid for all of the parts used in connection therewith. This involved considerable expense to the Company. (R 18, 19)
4
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On Friday, May 24, 1957, at about 1:00 p.m.,
the plaintiff and Mr. Funk drove to LaJunta, Colorado, to participate in the forthcoming race. (R 24)
Mr. Funk paid the gasoline and oil expenses incurred
on the trip, but each of the participants paid for his
own meals and living expenses during the trip and
while at the site of the races. Also, each participant
paid his own entry fee prior to the race.
A few days before leaving for the race, plaintiff
was contacted by Mr. John Brophy. Upon learning
that the defendant company was planning to test one
of its MGA cars at the LaJunta Race, Mr. Brophy
requested that Mr. Looser do the last minute racing
tune-up and adjustment work on his car at the site
of the race. In accordance with Mr. Brophy's instructions, the defendant charged him in advance
for any anticipated labor to be performed on his car
in LaJunta. (R31, 32) Just prior to the accident at
the Colorado track, plaintiff performed the work as
agreed. (R 23, 24)
Immediately prior to the commencement of the
racing competition both Mr. Funk and the plaintiff,
individually, engaged in familiarization trials with
the racing car to enable them to test the track and
determine whether the car was functioning properly.
Mr. Looser asked Mr. Funk if he could take the car
out on the track first, and the latter consented. They
then took turns trying out the car, each .going for
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a few laps at a time. On one occasion, Mr. Funk disapproved of the manner in which the plaintiff was
driving the vehicle. To show his disapproval and to
correct the situation, he stepped onto the signal lane
and motioned the plaintiff to slow down. Mr. Looser
then stopped the car and asked Mr. Funk if he wanted
to take the car out. Funk answered that he didn't
want to take the car out, but that he just wanted
Looser to slow down. (R 65, 66) Shortly thereafter,
while plaintiff was rounding a turn, the left rear
wheel of the vehicle collapsed, causing it to leave the
track and tum over, pinning the plaintiff in his seat.
As a result of this incident, plaintiff suffered a fractured dislocation of the lower dorsal spine \Yith paraplegia. The attending physician reported that the
patient will be permanently and totally disabled for
the rest of his life, due to complete paralysis of all
body parts below the \-Yaist. (R 10)
After a contested hearing, the Industrial Commission of Utah rendered its \Yritten decision adverse
to the plaintiff. (R 70, 71) HoV\·ever, no -written findings of fact or conclusions of la\v \Yere ever made
and filed in this matter by the commissioner.
On August 13, 1958, the plaintiff petitioned the
defendant Industrial Commission of Utah for a rehearing of his claim for Workman's Com,ensation
benefits. The application for''' ~hearing was filed
within the statutory period required for such applica..
tions. (R 72, 73)

6
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On September 11, 1958, plaintiff submitted his
Supplement to Application for Rehearing which was
then pending before the Commission. The Supplement was filed after the statutory period had elapsed
for the filing of Applications for Rehearing, but prior
to rendering of the decision of the Commission on
plaintiff's pending Application for Rehearing.
On September 16, 1958, the plaintiff made application to the Industrial Commission for an Order
for Examination of Records. (R79) The commissioner answered the application by letter dated September 22, 1958, denying authority to order the production of such records. It was suggested by the commissioner that plaintiff file a Subpeona duces tecum
to accomplish his purpose. (R 80)
On September 24, 1958, plaintiff answered the
letter of the commissioner. In the text of his answering letter, plaintiff asked that such letter be considered as a request for the issuance of the Subpeona
Duces Tecum referred to above. (R 82, 83) The
following day, the commissioner sent blank subpeona forms to plaintiff's attorney.
On September 25, 1958, plaintiff filed a Second
Supplement to Pending Application for Rehearing
with the commission. (R 87, 88) This second Supplement was also filed after the statutory period for the
filing of Applications for Rehearing had elapsed, but
7
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before the Commission rendered its decision denying
the pending Application for Rehearing. Both the
Supplements to the Pending Application for Rehearing alleged the discovery of new evidence which was
not available to the plaintiff at the time of the
hearing.
On September 29, 1958, the defendants filed a
Memorandum of Defendants. (R 89-93)
On September 30th, 1958, the plaintiff prepared
and mailed a Motion requesting permission to answer
the Memorandum of Defendants. (R 96) The records
of the commission show that the Motion was received
on October 1, 1958.
On the 3rd day of October, 1958, the plaintiff
received an Order of the commission denying his
Application for Rehearing. CR 94, 95) The postmark
on the envelope was dated October 2, 1958. In the
Order, the commission ruled that any document,
other than a brief, filed after the 30-day statutory
period had elapsed could not be considered by the
commission in reaching its decision in regard to the
pending Application for Rehearing.

8
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ARGUMENT

I. THE WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION ACT
SHOULD BE LIBERALLY CONSTRUED IN FAVOR OF COMPENSATION.
In compensation cases, the Utah Supreme Court
has uniformly held that all doubtful cases should
be resolved in favor of awarding compensation. See
M. & K. Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 112
Utah 488, 189 P. 2nd 132, Chandler vs. Industrial
Commission, 55 Utah 213, 184 P. 1020, Salt Lake City
v. Industrial Commission, 140 P. 2nd 644, 104 Utah
436.
In theM. & K. Corporation case, the Court said:
"We have also repeatedly held that this
statute should be liberally construed and if
there is any doubt respecting the right to compensation, it should be resolved in favor of
recovery." (Citing many cases.)
For a recent discussion of current trends toward
liberalization in awarding Workmen's Compensation
benefits, see 6 Utah L. Rev. 290 ( 1958).
II. UNDER UTAH STATUTES COMPENSATION
SHOULD BE AWARDED IF EITHER (A) THE
ACCIDENT ARISES OUT OF THE 'EMPLOYMENT, OR (B) IN THE COURSE OF THE EMPLOYMENT.
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently held
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that recovery of Workman's Compensation under
Section 35-1-45, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, may
be based on either one of two things: (a) That the
accident arose out of the employment, or (b) That
it occurred in the course of his employment. Prior
to 1919 the Section used the word "and," but in 1919
the Legislature substituted the word "or" and since
that date this court has consistently held that only
one or the other need be shown. This is pointed out
in numerous cases, one of the more recent being
M. & K. Corporation, supra, 112 Utah 488, in which
the court says:
"Since the 1919 amendment to that section (42-1-43) when the word 'or' which we
have italicized above was substituted for the
word 'and' it is not necessary for the accident
to arise both out of and occur in the course of
his employment, it is sufficient if the accident
only arises in the course of his employment.
Workmen's Compensation statutes both in this
country and throughout the British Empire
usually require, as did ours before the amendment, that the accident arise both out of and
in the course of the employment, and this
must be kept in mind in considering the decisions of other jurisdictions. We have often
pointed out this distinction and indicated in
many cases that the recovery was allowed on
that account and that it probably would not
have been allowed without the amendment."
There are numerous Utah cases to the same
effect. See Tavey v. Industrial Commission, 106 Utah
489, 150 P. 2nd 379; Park Utah Consolidated Mines
10
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Co. v. Industrial Commission, 103 Utah 64, 133 P.
2nd 314; Cudahy Packing Co. v. Industrial Commission, 60 Utah 161, 207 P. 148, and other cases cited
therein.
III. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION SHOULD
HAVE CONSIDERED THE ALLEGATIONS CONTAINED IN THE TWO SUPPLEMENTS TO
PENDING APPLICATION FOR REHEARING
BEFORE GRANTING OR DENYING PLAINTIFF'S APPLICATION FOR REHEARING.
The commissioner states in his Order denying
plaintiff's Application for Rehearing that no document, other than a brief, filed after the statutory
period has passed could be considered by the commission in arriving at its decision. The plaintiff has
been unable to find any indication in either judicial
precedent or statute that allegations contained in
supplements to pending applications for rehearing
should not be considered by the commission. It is
obvious from the record that the commission had not
yet arrived at its decision to deny the application
when the supplements were filed. Therefore, there
was no reason to refuse to consider the information
found in the supplements. In doing so, the commissioner's action was arbitrary and unreasonable. The
information was in the file at the time the case was
reconsidered and the decision was made. The fact
that the supplements were filed after the thirty day
period had run did not result in any inconvenience
11
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or delay to the commission. Therefore, the Order
denying the application for rehearing was not based
on the information which was available to the commission when it rendered its decision, and the proceeding should be sent back to the· industrial body
to be reheard and redetermined.
If the commission had recognized the supplements for rehearing, it would have been compelled
to grant a rehearing to the plaintiff. The supplements allege that new evidence was discovered that
was not available to the plaintiff at the time of the
initial hearing. If the allegations of the plaintiff can
be proved at a rehearing of the matter, the commission would be compelled to reverse its decision and
award the plaintiff compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act. In the case of Jensen v.
Logan City, 89 Utah 347, 57 P. 2nd 708, the Utah
Supreme Court stated the following in regards to
the granting of a new trial on the grounds of newly
discovered evidence:
"While the granting or refusing of the motion lies in the sound discretion of the court,
where there is grave suspicion that justice may
have miscarried because of the lack of enlightenment on a vital point which new evidence
will apparently supply, and the other elements
attendant on obtaining a new trial on the
ground of newly discovered evidence are present, it would be an abuse of sound discretion
not to grant the same."
12
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In plaintiff's first Supplement to Pending Application for Rehearing, it is alleged that newly discovered evidence favorable to plaintiff and not previously available to him at the time of the hearing
had been determined and discovered. The application contained allegations as to the purported testimony, if swom and allowed to testify, of John P.
Brophy, who was a contestant in the race at which
the plaintiff sustained his injuries. (R 75) It indicates that Mr. Brophy had a conversation with the
Vice-President and Service Manager of the corporation six weeks before the accident. At that time, the
company representative promised Mr. Brophy that if
he would undertake the expense of having his car
reworked in preparation for the LaJunta race at the
company shop, he would have Mr. Looser available
at LaJunta to tune up and repair the car and make
all necessary pre-race adjustments. He also promised
to supply all parts and tools which might be required
for said tune-up, repairs and adjustments. (R 75)
This evidence, if allowed, would have conclusively sustained the allegations of the plaintiff
that he was in the course of his employment at the
time of the accident, and would have shown that the
accident arose out of his_ employment. Therefore, the
court should annul the decision of the commission
and order that the matter be reheard to enable the
plaintiff to present the newly discovered evidence.·
See Miner v. Industrial Commission, .20.2 P . .2d
557, i 15 Utah 88.
13
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IV. THE COMMISSION ERRED IN FILING ITS
ORDER DENYING THE APPLICATION FOR
REHEARING WHILE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
REQUESTING PERMISSION TO ANSWER DEFENDANT'S MEMORANDUM WAS AWAITING ACTION BY THE COMMISSION.
On October 1, 1958, the plaintiff filed a motion
requesting permission to answer the Memorandum
of defendants filed with the commission on September 29, 1958. Without acting upon plaintiff's motion
in any way, the commission made its Order denying
the plaintiff's Application for Rehearing. Common
trial practices require that when a motion is filed in
a case pending before the Court, it must be ruled
upon before the case can proceed. In other words,
the Motion suspends further proceedings until it is
disposed of by the Court. By ignoring plaintiff's Motion, the commission committed prejudicial error.
Its failure to act on the pending Motion rendered its
decision premature. The case 'Yas not ready for a
decision because an important procedural step had
not been completed. Although the instant case is
before an administrative body rather than a judicial
one, the requirements of procedural fair play demand that the plaintiff's Motion to answer defendant's Memorandum of Authorities should be granted
or denied. In this case, the commission arbitrarily
ignored plaintiff's Motion. In doing so it violated
the rudimentary requirements of procedural due
process provided to the plaintiff by the provisions of
14
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the Constitution of the United States. Therefore, the
decision rendered by the commission should be annulled, and the commission should be ordered to rehear the matter now before the Court.
See Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1-82
L. Ed. 1129.
V. THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH IS
REQUIRED BYLAW TO MAKE WRITTEN FINDINGS OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW.
The Industrial Commission of Utah failed to file
written findings of facts and conclusions of law
with its secretary after the hearing of this matter.
It merely rendered its decision, wherein the commissioner reviewed parts of the evidence and held
against the plaintiff. Under the Utah Workman's
Compensation Statutes, the Industrial Commission
is expressly required to make Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law in writing and file the same with
its secretary after each formal hearing.
35-1-85 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, reads as
follows:
"DUTY OF COMMISSION TO MAKE FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW -- FILING -- CONCLUSIVENESS ON
QUESTIONS OF FACT -- REVIEW -- COURT
JUDGMENT.
"After each formal hearing, it shall be the
15
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duty of the commission to make findings. of
fact and conclusions of law in writing and file
the same with its secretary. The findings and
conclusions of the commission on questions of
fact shall be conclusive and final and shall not
be subject to review; such questions of fact
shall include ultimate facts and the findings
and conclusions of the commission. The commission and every party to the action or proceeding before the commission shall have the
right to appear in the review proceeding. Upon the hearing the court shall enter judgment
either affirming or setting aside the award."
Prior to 1949 the a hove statute did not include
the first sentence as quoted above. In that year the
Legislature amended the statute and added the first
sentence as it now appears. The lawmakers left the
wording of the former statute intact, but added the
first sentence of the statute at that time. Utah cases
decided by the Supreme Court of Utah prior to the
amendment held that written findings of fact and
conclusions of law were not necessary.
See: Jones vs. Industrial Commission, 90 Utah
121, 61 P2d 10. Salt Lake City v. lndw;trial Comnzission, 103 Utah 581, 137 P2d
364.
By an1ending the statute the Legislature made
it mandatory that findings of fact and conclusions
of law be made in writing and filed vdth the secretary of the commission in each case. Plaintiff has
16
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been unable to find any Utah cases dealing with this
statute since it was amended. However, in other
states having statutes similar to those in Utah, the
courts have universally held that if the trial court
or commission fails to make findings of fact and conclusions of law in writing, the decision of the hearing
body must be reversed. Among these are the States
of California and Kentucky.
The California Labor Code, Section 5313, reads
as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT AND AWARD, ORDER,
ETC.: WHEN TO BE MADE BY COMMISSION: REPORT: SEPARATE STATEMENT
OF FACTS AND CONCLUSIONS:
"The commission, panel, every referee or
commissioner shall, within thirty days after
testimony is closed make and file findings
upon all facts irivolved in controversy and an
award, order or decision, stating the determination as to the rights of the parties, and in
addition thereto and concurrently therewith
shall make and file a written report. Such report shall separately state the findings of fact
and conclusions of laW. The findings, decisions, order, or award and the accompanying
report shall, if made by the commission and
panel, be signed by a majority of the commission."
Recent California cases which hold, that the Industrial Commission must comply with the above
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statute are Pierson v. Industrial Commission, 98, Cal.
2d. 598, 220 p2d 794 and Dawson et al v. Industrial
Commission et al., 54 Cal. App. 2d 594, 129 P2d 479,
( 1942).
In the Pierson case the Calnornia court set forth
the requirements under the above statute as follows:
''The commission should make specific
findings on all material issues presented in a
claim for compensation." (Quoting many
cases)
"The findings of the commission should
conform to the general rules applicable to
findings in trials which are conducted in the
Superior Court." (Quoting many cases)
The court held that in view of the failure of
the commission to find or determine the issue of joint
employment, the a\Yard would be annulled and cause
remanded for further proceedings on that issue.
Section 4933 of the Kentucky Statutes relating
to the administration of the Kentucky Workman's
Compensation La\v provides as follo,vs:
"The board or any of its members shall
hear the parties at issue and their representatives and \Yitnesses shall determine the dispute
in a sun1mary manner. The award, together
with a statement of findings of fact, rulings of
law and other matters pertinent to the question
at issue, shall be filed with the record of pro18
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ceedings and a copy of the award shall immediately be sent to the parties in dispute."
Typical of all the Kentucky decisions pertaining
to the above statute is the case of Yeager v. Mengel
Company, 242 Kentucky 543. 46 S.W. 2d, 1076. In
that case the Court stated the law as follows:
"The identical question has been presented ·
to this court in a number of recent cases, and
we find the prevailing rule to be that, where
there is a dispute in the facts or as to the
natural inferences to be drawn from the proof,
and the award is not accompanied with a
statement of the findings of fact, etc., as required by the statute, the case will be remanded back through th~ Circuit Court to the compensation board, with directions to make the
award in strict conformity with the statute."
(Citing many cases)
In the instant case the Utah law is very specific.
The amendment to the statute makes writte'n findings of fact and conclusions of law mandatory. Since
the Industrial Commission failed to follow the requirements of the statute, it is impossible to tell what
facts were found in reaching the decision and upon
what conclusions of law the decision is based. Because
of the failure to conform to the laws of the State of
Utah, the commission's decision cannot stand and
must be sent back for a rehearing.
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VI. THE ACCIDENT INVOLVED HERE AROSE
OUT OF PLAINTIFF'S EMPLOYMENT.
The decision shows that the Industrial Commission concerned itself primarily, if not exclusively,
with the question of whether or not the plaintiff was
acting in the course of his employment when he was
injured. The commissioner touched on certain facts
which indicated that he placed the issue as one of
whether or not the defendant could control the activities of the plaintiff at the LaJunta race. Let us
concede, for purposes of this argument, that he was
not in the course of his employment when he was
injured. Nevertheless, the Utah statutes under the
cases cited in point II above, allow recovery if the
accident which resulted in Mr. Looser's injury arose
out of his employment.
We submit that except for the fact that plaintiff
was employed by the company, he would never have
been injured. The record shows that the President
of the defendant company urged the plaintiff to take
part in racing activities 'vith his own automobile,
but he '''anted the trophies 'von in such activities to be placed in the company showcase for
advertising purposes. (R14) Hovvever, plaintiff refused to race his own car, c!aiming that racing was
too hard on it. Then Vaughn Funk, an officer of the
corporation, told the plaintiff to fix up a company
car for racing purposes. The record further shows
that other company cars had been raced at similar
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races in previous years. (R 22) Mr. Schettler, the
company President, had told the plaintiff that he
considered such activities as good advertising for the
corporation. (R 22) Mr. Schettler admitted on crossexamination that the company experienced an increase in business around race time. (R54) Because
the plaintiff was paid on a commission basis for the
work which he performed (R 12), he had a pecuniary
interest in an increase of the company's business
volume. To facilitate the participation of the company in future races, he even volunteered to do the
labor on the racing vehicle without special charge.
The company did not hesitate to furnish all of the
parts free of charge for this venture. Are we to
assume that the defendant would give over $250.00
in parts (R 18, 19) and risk damage to a $5,000.00
vehicle because it wanted to keep its employees
happy? This would be a ridiculous assumption. However, the commission arrived at just such a conclusion. It is obvious that the company was happy to
see the plaintiff go to the race. It not only encouraged
him to do so, but also cheered his decision to go. It
even allowed him time off to travel to the site of the
race. (R 24) The fact that he was willing to prepare
the car for them without special labor costs should
not be used to deprive him of the benefits to which
he is entitled under the Workman's Compensation
Act.
Cases cited hereinafter will demonstrate that it
is not necessary that the racing of company vehicles
21
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be specifically required of an employee before he
can recover compensation under the provisions of the
Act. All that is required is that the participation in
races be reasonably related or incident to the employment. If it is, and an injury results therefrom, then
the injury results from an accident which arises out
of the employment. The cases are uniform to the
effect that the words "arising out of" are construed
to refer to the origin or cause of the injury, and involve the idea that the accident is in some sense due
to or caused by the employment, and the words "in
the course or' refer to the time, place, and circumstances under which it occurred. See Utah Apex
Mining Company v. Industrial Commission, supra.
The case of Re:i,nert v. ~dustrial Accident Commission, 139 Cal. App. 2d 851, 294
P. 2d. 713, is factually related to the case
before the court. In that case, the plaintiff
was employed as a recreational director at
a camp set up for girl scouts. She \Yas allowed to
take advantage of the recreational facilities available near her employment. She \Yas injured while
riding horseback on her day off. The California
court held that the injury arose from an accident
arising out of and in the course of her employment
even though she "·as riding for her own recreation
and was in an area off the premises of the employer
and not under its control. The court thought that
the most significant consideration was whether or
22.
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not the activity was related to the employment or
contemplated as part of the employment, and the
fact that the injury occurred on premises not owned
or controlled by the employer was not important.
Other cases which follow the rule that the injury
is compensable if received in an accident occurring
while the employee is doing those reasonable things
which his employment expressly or impliedly authorizes him to do are: Employer's Group v. Industrial Accident Commission, 37 Cal. App. 2nd 567,
99P. 2d 1089, 1092, Phoenix Indemnity Co. v. Industrial Accident Commission, 31 Cal. 2d 856, 193 P.
2d 745.
Another California case which is closely related
to the above cases is that of Winter v. Industrial
Accident Commission, 129 Cal. App. 2d 174. 276 P.
2d 691. That case involved a claim for compensation by a golf caddy who lost an eye while playing
golf. The injury occurred on the claimant's day off,
while he was engaged in recreational activity permitted by the employer. The club where the claimant was employed allowed its caddies to use the
facilities provided for its members and customers
on Monday of each week, that day being their day
off. Significant in this case is the fact that permission to use the facilities of the employer was based
solely upon the fact that the claimant was employed
as a caddy. In allowing compensation, the Court
made the following statement:
23
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"It was the employment which created
the facts and conditions that brought the
petitioner to the premises of his employer to
engage in the permitted and encouraged recreational activity. The accident could have
happened only at one place and the presence
of the petitioner was due to his employment."
The plaintiff is of the opinion that the Winter
case and the instant case are very closely related.
Mr. Looser would not have been engaged in
racing if he hadn't been encouraged and permitted by his employer to do so. Sports Car Incorporated even furnished the vehicle which was used
in the race.
We submit that in the instant case it was the
plaintiff's employment which created the facts and
circumstances that took the plaintiff to La Junta,
Colorado, to engage in competitive racing. The
accident could have happened at only one place,
and the presence of the plaintiff vYas due to his
employment.
VII. THE PLAINTIFF 'VAS ACTING IN THE
COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT ''THEN THE
ACCIDENT OCCURRED.
We believe that a reading of the decision of the
Industrial Commission shovvs that the commission
concerned itself primarily, if not exclusively, with
the question of whether or not the defendant had
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the right to control the plaintiff's activities at the
time of the injury. It held that no such right of
control was present. We wish to point out
that the commission completely ignored the uncontradicted testimony of Mr. Vaughn Funk, an officer
of the corporation, showing that he exercised actual
control over th.e plaintiff's activities at the time of
the accident. Mr. Funk testified that he stepped out
into the signal lane of the track during the pre-race
trials and motioned to Mr. Looser to slow down.
Plaintiff saw the signal, stopped the vehicle and
asked Funk if he wished to drive. He answered that
he did not want to drive, but that he merely wanted
Looser to slow down. · The plaintiff complied with
these instructions. CR 66) The commisssion made
no mention of this incident in its decision, even
though the incident shows the exercise of actual
control by an officer of the defendant corporation
over the manner in which plaintiff operated the
vehicle on the track. In ignoring this uncontradicted
testimony, the commission erred. Therefore, the
Court should vacate the decision and instruct the
Commission to award compensation to the plaintiff
as prayed in this appeal. See Kent v. Industrial
Commission, 89 U. 381, 57, P. 2d 724; and Spencer
v. Industrial Commission 40 P. 2d 188. 87 U. 336.
While at the cite of the La Junta races, and
prior to the accident, the plaintiff did last minute
tune-up and adjustment work on a vehicle belong25
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ing to one John Brophy, a regular customer of the
defendant corporation. The work was done in accordance with an agreement made with the customer several days before the race. Although this was
not the primary purpose of the trip to La Junta, the
record shows that company business was performed
by the plaintiff at the cite of the races, and that the
employer benefited therefrom by receiving money
from Mr. Brophy for those services. The record
shows that advance payment was made for such
services, Mr. Brophy having paid the company
before leaving Salt Lake City for La Junta. A duty
then arose which obligated the company to perform
services for the customer at the cite of the race.
Mr. Looser could hardly have refused to render
such services upon his arrival in La Junta. He had
a duty to perform such services, on behalf of his
employer, on the Brophy car in La Jlinta. Where
such a duty exists, the injury arose out of or in the
course of plaintiff's employment. See Stroud v.
Industrial Commission, 272 P. 2d 187, 2 U. 2d 270.
\Ve are of the opinion that the Industrial Commission failed to recognize the true significance of
the service being rendered to the defendant corporation by the plaintiff. The commissioner's decision
stated that the defendant may have received some
incidental advertising benefit, but he disregarded it
as a factor to be considered in rendering the decision. We submit that the commission erred in
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failing to recognize the proper significance of this
benefit to the company when it reached its decision.
There are many cases which have allowed
compensation to employees who were injured while
participating in company sponsored recreational
activities. The courts have generally allowed recovery in cases where the employer has received substantial benefit in the form of good will through
public interest in teams sponsored as part of company recreational activity. These cases usually
involve situations where the company receives advertising benefit from the company sponsored team,
but is not engaged in the business of sports promotion as part of its usual course of business.

Holst v. New York Stock Exchange, 252, App.
Div. 233, 299 N.Y.S. 255, is a case that involved a
youth employed by the stock exchange as a page.
He was injured while playing soccer on a team
maintained by his employer. The officials of the
stock exchange assisted in organizing the soccer and
other athletic teams, and the employees were urged
to engage in these competitive sports. The employees
were given time off for practice and for competitive
games, and at times, consideration was given to the
athletic prowess of the applicants when the new
employees. were hired. The New York court held
that the maintenance of the terms was a matter of
business to the stock exchange, and that the claim27
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ant was engaged in his employment when he was
injured.
Another case which supports the abo:ve proposition is that of LeBar v. Ewald Bros. Dairy, 217
Minn. 16, 13 N. W. 2d 729. The facts of that case
showed that Ewald Bros. Dairy was engaged in the
dairy business. However, the company sponsored a
softball team for its employees. It furnished balls,
bats and other equipment, including shirts with
the name of "Ewald" printed on the back. It never
required its employees to play on a team or attend
the games. Such participation by the employees was
entirely voluntary. The games were played after
the regular hours of employment. LeBar was injured
while playing in a softball game. In awarding
compensation, the Court said:
"Concededly, respondent when playing
on the team when injured was not engaged
in any actual work of the dairy business. It
occurred after his regular hours of work. His
employers had not ordered him to be there.
He knew he lost no wage, nor did he endanger
his position as an employee by not participating in the game."
The court held that the injury arose out of and
in the course of employment. It held that the injury
was incident to and a part <;>f the company's business.
See also Piusinski v. Transit Valley Country Club,
259 App. Div. 765, 18 N.Y. S. 2d, 316; Dower v.
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Saratoga Springs, Comm., 267 App. Div. 928, 46
N.Y. S. 2d 822; Linderman v. Cownie Furs, 234
Iowa 708, 13 N. W. 2d 677; University of Denver v.
Nemeth, 257 P. 2d 423.
In the Utah case of Auerbach v. Industrial
Commission, 195 P. 2d 245, 113 U. 347, the Utah
court holds contrary to the above. However, it is
the contention of the plaintiff that the instant case
should be distinguished from the Auerbach case. In
the Auerbach decision, the Utah court refused to
allow compensation to a company employee who
was injured while on a trip to play basketball for
a team sponsored by the Auerbach Company. In
that case, the company was engaged in the business
of selling dry goods, and the sponsoring of athletic
teams was not its primary activity. Any benefit
which resulted therefrom was of no consequence.
The Utah court indicated that the Auerbach
Company was in the business of selling dry goods,
not in the promotion of sporting events.
In the instant case, however, the activity was
directly related to the business of the company.
Sports Cars Incorporated was in the business of
selling MGA sports cars. Racing was its best type
of advertising. It is difficult to conceive that the
company would supply an expensive car merely for
the purpose of providing recreation and thrills for
its employees.
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It is conceded that the plaintiff was not hired
as a race driver, but the facts show that the company had no such drivers. The employees and
officers did that kind of work in addition to their
other duties. The fact that none of them were hired
especially for this limited purpose does not take them
out of the course of their employment, while engaging in those activities.
CONCLUSION

In the light of the foregoing facts and authorities, it is respectfully submitted that the decision
of the Industrial Commission be vacated, and that
the commission be ordered to award compensation
to the plaintiff in accordance with the laws of the
State of Utah, or that the commission be ordered
to grant a rehearing of the evidence in the above
case.
Respectfully Submitted,

BARTON, KLEMM & GOWANS
410 Continental Bank Building,
Salt Lake City, Utah
OWEN AND VVARD
AND ROY G. HASLAM
1+1 East Second South Street,
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Plaintiff
30
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

